Moment of truth for Khamenei ... and for Iran? (Laura Secor)
On Khamenei:
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What are Khamenei’s options? With protesters yelling “Down with the dictator” in the streets of nearly every city in Iran, his position could not be more precarious. He has staked his very legitimacy, and perhaps that of the edifice he sits atop, on forcing Iranians to accept Ahmadinejad’s supposed landslide victory. He can continue to try to force that down their throats with a show of raw power, or he can bend, which would show the opposition that he and the system are not really so powerful after all, that they are vulnerable to pressure from below. If he takes the latter road, it would be a radical departure from his style of governance up until now. This is the regime that violently quelled protest movements in 1999 and in 2002, crushed the hopes of reformers under Mohammad Khatami from 1997 through 2005, and apparently could not tolerate even the possibility of a Mousavi Presidency. But if he chooses the path of violence, he will transform his country into a crude and seething autocracy.
This is uncharted territory for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Until now, the regime has survived through a combination of repression and flexibility. [....] So is there any way Khamenei can dial the situation back even to the unhappy modus vivendi of June 11th? [....]
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On Moussavi:
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There is good reason to think that Khamenei found the possibility of a Mousavi Presidency, backed by the sort of youth movement that became evident in the days just prior to the election, intolerable. [....] And if there could be any doubt that Mousavi would prove a stronger advocate than Khatami for the agenda of his constituency, his steadfast, courageous behavior in the last three days has put it to rest.
Who knows what sort of president Mousavi would have been, or could yet be? He is an entirely different kind of animal from reformist politicians of the past; he is identified not with students and intellectuals but with the hardscrabble war years and the defense of the poor. But as one analyst explained to me, the problem he faces is that he is perhaps the only person on the Iranian political scene whose public stature is equal to Khamenei’s. He was a favorite son of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the nineteen-eighties. Many Khomeinists in the power structure respect and support him; within the Revolutionary Guards, as well as within the upper clergy, he has a constituency. Traditional, religious people are among his supporters, too. On the morning of June 12th, he may have been the uncharismatic compromise candidate for the anyone-but-Ahmadinejad crowd. But to other voters he was then, and he has increasingly become, something else: the vehicle both for the memory of the utopia that never came, and for the hopes of a younger generation that imagines he shares its vision of the future.
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Read the whole thing.
--Jeff Weintraub
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New Yorker "News Desk" (On-Line)
Tuesday, June 16, 2009
LAURA SECOR: THE SUPREME LEADER'S NEXT MOVE
Today begins with seemingly contradictory news from Iran: the Guardian Council, a body of clerics that holds more power than the President or the parliament, has agreed to recount some of the votes from Friday’s disputed election. At the same time, the regime has expelled some members of the foreign press, forbidden Iranian journalists from leaving their offices, and arrested major reformist figures, including the former Vice-President Mohammad Ali Abtahi, the former member of parliament Behzad Nabavi, and the reformist political strategist Saeed Hajjarian. These are men with impeccable revolutionary credentials—Hajjarian and Nabavi were founders of the Islamic Republic’s intelligence apparatus—and unquestionable loyalty to the constitutional order. What is going on here?
The Guardian Council’s gambit, while not entirely without promise, should be viewed with some skepticism. First, the council is not recounting all the ballots, if they can be found; it is reviewing only disputed ballot boxes, whatever that means. Second, this is not a disinterested review of the election results; in Iranian politics, the Guardian Council is essentially the practical hand of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the organ by which he most directly intervenes in the affairs of state. Through it, he has veto power over all legislation and can disqualify candidates for public office at will. Its members are directly or indirectly appointed by the Supreme Leader, and manifestly beholden to him. So this is not a neutral intervention; it is Khamenei’s next move.
That’s what makes it interesting and, for the moment, perplexing. What are Khamenei’s options? With protesters yelling “Down with the dictator” in the streets of nearly every city in Iran, his position could not be more precarious. He has staked his very legitimacy, and perhaps that of the edifice he sits atop, on forcing Iranians to accept Ahmadinejad’s supposed landslide victory. He can continue to try to force that down their throats with a show of raw power, or he can bend, which would show the opposition that he and the system are not really so powerful after all, that they are vulnerable to pressure from below. If he takes the latter road, it would be a radical departure from his style of governance up until now. This is the regime that violently quelled protest movements in 1999 and in 2002, crushed the hopes of reformers under Mohammad Khatami from 1997 through 2005, and apparently could not tolerate even the possibility of a Mousavi Presidency. But if he chooses the path of violence, he will transform his country into a crude and seething autocracy.
This is uncharted territory for the Islamic Republic of Iran. Until now, the regime has survived through a combination of repression and flexibility. The dispersal of power throughout a complex system, among rival political factions, and with the limited but active participation of the voting public, has allowed a basically unpopular regime to control a large population with only limited and targeted violence. There have always been loopholes and pressure points that allow the opposition and the regime to be dance partners, even if one or both of them is secretly brandishing a knife behind the other’s back. That has been less true under Ahmadinejad than in the past. But the culture of the organized opposition under the Islamic Republic has tended to remain cautious and moderate. Many of the protesters of recent days are not calling for an end to the Islamic Republic. They are calling for their votes to be counted. More nights like last night, however, when some seven protesters were allegedly shot, could swiftly change that.
So is there any way Khamenei can dial the situation back even to the unhappy modus vivendi of June 11th? He could have the Guardian Council concede that the official figures were wrong, and assert that the vote was close enough, after all, to send the election to a second round between Mousavi and Ahmadinejad. If this had been the initial announcement from the Interior Ministry on June 12th, it would have been entirely plausible. Ahmadinejad has a reliable base that could comprise as much as thirty per cent of the country, as well as all the advantages of incumbency, including access to state television; his conservative challenger, Mohsen Rezai, had amassed little momentum; and, at least until Mousavi’s late surge, there was a real contest between Mousavi and Karroubi for the hearts of the uncommitted. A split vote and a run-off would hardly have raised an eyebrow in the first instance. But to call one now, after having already endorsed a landslide victory for Ahmadinejad and called out riot police to enforce it, would be an admission that a brute power grab had been attempted and abandoned.
If Khamenei did allow a second round, the next question is whether he would be prepared to conduct it under some kind of monitoring that would be acceptable to both sides, and whether he would be prepared to accept the outcome, whatever it might be. There is good reason to think that Khamenei found the possibility of a Mousavi Presidency, backed by the sort of youth movement that became evident in the days just prior to the election, intolerable. Imagine him accepting a Mousavi Presidency backed by a revved-up, furious, volatile crowd—one that has just emerged victorious from street battles with the Supreme Leader’s own militias. And if there could be any doubt that Mousavi would prove a stronger advocate than Khatami for the agenda of his constituency, his steadfast, courageous behavior in the last three days has put it to rest.
Who knows what sort of president Mousavi would have been, or could yet be? He is an entirely different kind of animal from reformist politicians of the past; he is identified not with students and intellectuals but with the hardscrabble war years and the defense of the poor. But as one analyst explained to me, the problem he faces is that he is perhaps the only person on the Iranian political scene whose public stature is equal to Khamenei’s. He was a favorite son of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in the nineteen-eighties. Many Khomeinists in the power structure respect and support him; within the Revolutionary Guards, as well as within the upper clergy, he has a constituency. Traditional, religious people are among his supporters, too. On the morning of June 12th, he may have been the uncharismatic compromise candidate for the anyone-but-Ahmadinejad crowd. But to other voters he was then, and he has increasingly become, something else: the vehicle both for the memory of the utopia that never came, and for the hopes of a younger generation that imagines he shares its vision of the future.
posted by Jeff Weintraub at 9:59 AM
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